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Idea-making and Crises: Contradictions between the Presentation, Argumentation and Form 
of Ideas in Selected Works of Descartes and Voltaire 
Lauren Clark, University of Sunderland 
 
Readers of Descartes and Voltaire may wish to join me in wallowing in the theoretical mire of 
distinction between what makes French literature stylistically dissimilar from French philosophical 
discourse. For the French there is no such predicament. While an autochthon may have difficulty 
with the content of a text, the literary form is their own; the discours, essai, lettre, traité and the less 
esteemed roman. This is not to say that utter comprehension and stylistic clarity is instilled in 
French heritage, but rather that the artificial constructs within which words are placed are 
something subliminally à la française, something instinctive. For example, if a person of Anglo-
Saxon orientation attends university in France and finds him or herself failing to meet satisfactory 
requirements à l'écriture, being incapable of composing a brief, yet concise compte rendu or writing 
an unordered discours which aspires to verbosity rather than structure, it would not be through lack 
of basic textual comprehension, but rather a result of unfamiliarity with literary constructs. As such, 
obeying a literary dogma which is unfamiliar or foreign to one’s own, not only overhauls all 
preconceived structural and stylistic notions held as doctrine: it also evokes crisis. Further, when it 
comes to translation, it seems like a literary treason.  
 Voltaire acknowledges this most markedly in his attempted translation of The Earl of 
Rochester's Satire on Man in Lettres Philosophiques, whereby he makes known his grievances of 
translating the “free renderings” (Voltaire 2005, 103) of English poets into a firm French 
vernacular: 
 
 Voici à peu près comme s'exprime le comte de Rochester, dans sa satire sur l'homme; mais il 
 faut que le lecteur se ressouvienne toujours que ce sont ici des traductions libres de poètes 
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 anglais, et que la gêne de notre versification et les bienséances délicates de notre langue ne 
 peuvent donner l'équivalent de la licence impétueuse du style anglais. (Voltaire 2005, 79) 
 
The problem of reproducing English poetic hotheadedness in a foreign tongue is much like fitting a 
jigsaw piece into the wrong place. Voltaire cuts off the edges of the jigsaw piece to position it in a 
new whole. In this creative rather than emulative process, the aim is to evade crisis by renovating 
poetic form and defying French stylistic propriety in one fell swoop.  When addressing texts which 
are philosophical-literary hybrids, therefore, the sheer stylistic intimidation encountered by readers, 
translators and authors alike call for a deeper investigation into their composition: “Only an 
intrepid, wildly courageous and probably doomed philosopher would launch herself with an essay 
on philosophic methodology” (Rorty 1983, 547). 
 Taking the examples of Les Passions de l'âme (1649) and the Discours de la méthode 
(1637) by René Descartes and Voltaire's Lettres Philosophiques (1728) and Le Philosophe ignorant 
(1766), an analysis of the varying manipulations of the complications and crises of presentation, 
argumentation and form within these texts will be portrayed. Far from regurgitating textual 
analyses, the aim is to expose, expound and explore varying power struggles, verging on crisis 
between form and content in these texts. Instances of contradictory authorial intent may be regarded 
as detrimental, conducive to or quite apart from the original thesis of the text. The manipulation of 
mimicry, evasion, abstraction and rhetoric in these texts can be seen to both divest the reader of 
trust, all the while placing him or her as pawns in a grander scheme of narrative. It is only through 
an analysis of the voices and masks adopted by Descartes and Voltaire in their writings that their 
structural evasion and formal deceptiveness can be appreciated. In this manner, both Descartes and 
Voltaire can be viewed as prime movers in instigating an overturning of accepted philosophical 
enquiry to enrich development of French thought in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and 
beyond. Aside from their rebellious experimentations in form, narrative and genre, it is thanks to a 
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distaste of aristocratic values concerning the noble soul and inherited noble jurisdiction on 
philosophical matters that both philosophers appeased crises in the run up to the Enlightenment to 
entail philosophical development. Offering up the fundamental separation of moral relativity from 
philosophy and importing Lockean models respectively, it is essential to consider Descartes and 
Voltaire as literary rhetoricians as well as pragmatic and schismatic penseurs. 
 To begin with, a comparative analysis of Le Philosophe ignorant and the Discours de la 
méthode will be given so as to explore the phenomenon of textual construction through editing and 
publication. It will be considered whether or not the assimilation of texts and their layout is 
indicative of a sense of authorship or further frameworks of meaning given the seventeenth and 
eighteenth century context in which they were written, considering censorship laws and the threat of 
auto-da-fé. Secondly, in order to comprehend the Discours, its style, narrative and rhetoric must be 
examined. Descartes indebtedness to Montaigne and different theories as to how the méthode came 
to be a subject of his other works can be regarded in this instance also. Finally, the crisis of textual 
classification and French philosophical thought will be considered. This arises most prominently in 
Lettres Philosophiques which can be digested as travel writing, satire and an experiment in 
epistolary narrative. In examining these literary modes in the context of Restoration England and 
the French Enlightenment, it can be argued that this piece was more aligned with satire than any 
other literary genre. 
 
I.  The assembly line: composition, editing and publication 
 
While Voltaire and Descartes can be likened for literary preoccupations with disguise, the impact 
that their philosophical writings brought to bear upon the history of French thought cannot be 
understated. In the early seventeenth century, the lingering influence of the Scholastics and classical 
philosophy in French pedagogy offered little in the way of philosophical development for Descartes 
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who had undergone an unsatisfying education at La Flèche. Descartes’ permissiveness not only to 
use doubt as a methodological process of reasoned enquiry but also to enlist this postulation using 
first person narrative in the Discours could not possibly sit well with traditionalists of the school of 
Aristotle. The “new philosophy” of the Discours was published in Leiden in 1637 and was 
circulated quite safely amidst a Dutch readership familiar with the printed circulation of unorthodox 
philosophical ideas. 
 As far as blasphemy and the offensive are concerned, the respective readerships of Descartes 
and Voltaire were neither disaffected nor naive. Events surrounding the incarceration of the latter in 
the Bastille from 1716-1717 make this patently evident and provoked him adopt the nom de plume 
Voltaire. However, whether or not these parties were conscious of the research behind and 
construction of Voltaire’s Le Philosophe ignorant and Descartes’ Discours de la méthode before the 
texts arrived at the printers remains to be seen. What is apparent is that if the true composition of 
each of these texts was made public at the time of their issue, much of the bafflement and blind 
appreciation  initially evoked would be critically reassessed.  
 If we are to believe Gilbert Gadoffre's analysis, the Discours de la méthode is far from a 
chronological construct but one written piecemeal, assimilated from various works the author was 
writing pre-1637. This explains to some extent why the content may be found in part contradictory 
and the style and presentation lacking in cohesion, bordering on disorganisation. Gadoffre asserts 
that parts III and VI (the morale provisoire and an introduction to Descartes’ later works 
respectively) are the only original parts within the entire six part schema. Parts I, IV and V had been 
taken from earlier works; 
 
 La première partie va sur les traces de l’Histoire de mon Esprit de 1628 […] 
 La IVe partie reprend les arguments au début de son séjour en Hollande […] 
 La Ve partie est un resumé du Monde. (Gadoffre 1941, 26) 
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What is shocking here is not the prospect that readers have been duped into believing the work was 
composed amidst the stream of consciousness which Descartes’ first person narration dictates; 
rather, it is that the Discours was partly a public relations enterprise to test public appeal before 
releasing Des Météores and La Dioptrique for publication. If the latter is true, Descartes’ rhetoric of 
persuasion and the ambivalence in genre seem all the more tactful and revealing of a suspicious 
psyche intent on guaranteeing his own success. The haphazard addition of one of his genuine 
articles, part III, at the printing office speaks volumes as regards his approach to editing, which is at 
least mildly hesitant and at most frenetic. There is a distinctive contradiction between presenting an 
example of printed, premeditated thought and the manner in which articles were interchanged à la 
dernière minute. There is nevertheless no attempt made by the author to disguise the fact that 
inspiration, planning and the articulation of ideas is a meticulous process which cannot be rushed. 
Having moved to Germany to live in self-imposed exile, Descartes sheds some light onto the 
duration and pace of his enquiries, 
  
 Toutefois ces neuf ans s'écoulèrent avant que j'eusse encore pris aucun parti touchant les 
 difficultés qui ont coutume d'être disputées entre les doctes […]et il y a justement huit ans 
 que ce désir me fit résoudre à m'éloigner  de tous les lieux où je pouvais avoir des 
 connaissances, et à me retirer ici […] j'ai pu vivre aussi solitaire et retiré que dans les déserts 
 les plus écartés. (Descartes 2005, 33-34)  
 
When he discusses the abandonment of friends, academic literature, cohorts and others who may 
distract him from his pursuit of truth, the implication is that he will follow reasoned enquiry to 
ultimate truth in a somewhat routine manner. Empty surroundings allow the philosopher to channel 
his thoughts more coherently towards his end goal. Given that he encourages man to doubt all, the 
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quest for Descartes aims as much for psychological betterment as for philosophical discovery. 
Amidst circumspection of our thoughts, the notion of time becomes an irrelevant entity as it had 
taken the philosopher eight years to quit France: concrete timeframes are used to confine menial 
human activities while philosophical introspection has no stopwatch. As such, it is perfectly 
imaginable that Descartes took a similar approach to the formulation of the Discours, taking a great 
time to translate a carefully constructed mind-method into something crude and readily 
understandable on the page. One would think that a little catharsis may be in store for the 
philosopher after having undergone the painstaking transcription of an eight year culmination of 
ideas. Descartes was nevertheless persecuted by the Sorbonne who enacted an auto-de-fé of his 
literature and accused him of holding atheistic beliefs contrary to both Catholic and Protestant 
tenets. Surprisingly, as the Cartesian school progressed after Descartes’ death in 1650, fear of 
censorship increased with the outlawing of the teaching of Cartesian philosophy in European 
institutions beginning with the University of Louvain in 1662. It made it quite clear that when it 
comes to publishing, great care should be taken to avoid upsetting censors, because writing of 
extreme positions may lead to a Galilean fate. Fearing such, after publication of the Discours 
Descartes personally burned a number of his books. In this manner, through upholding 
nonconformist philosophical enquiry, Descartes predicates and admits the need for his premeditated 
composition and its diverse derivations.  
 
 Or il y a maintenant trois ans que j'étais parvenu à la fin du traité [. . .] et que je commençais 
 à le revoir afin de le mettre entre les mains d'un imprimeur lorsque j'appris que des 
 personnes à qui je défère [. . .] avaient désapprouvé une opinion de physique publiée un peu 
 auparavant [. . .] et cela me fit craindre qu'il ne s'en trouvât tout de même quelqu’une entre 
 les miennes en laquelle je me fusse mépris. (Descartes 2005, 63) 
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However, the motives behind Descartes’ composition of the Discours need not be viewed in an 
entirely negative light. It would be unfair and condescending to refer to Descartes as the malin 
génie who consciously and cruelly leaves out suppositions in mathematical equations. Instead, he 
can be considered as an exponent of his own method in theory to the very point of its publication.  
Perhaps the author wished to portray his active involvement with his work by putting into action 
phases three and four of his method, just before publication: the synthesis stage—“conduire par 
ordre mes pensées” (Descartes 2005, 23)—and the listing and linking stage—“faire partout des 
dénombrements” (Descartes 2005, 24). In this way, Descartes makes apparent the pedagogical and 
didactic nature of his work, it being infectious enough to be employed by the author himself.  
 Although one hundred and seventeen years separate the works, composition of the 
Philosophe Ignorant and Les Passions de l'âme can be likened, initially, on the very superficial 
basis that they were both the products of greying philosophers who wrote in secluded locations. The 
former remains one of the lesser known works of Voltaire but was nevertheless one of the most 
controversial, and was claimed to be his own Discours de la method as it decries Descartes, 
Gassendi and his unenlightened predecessors as atheists (Carr 1965, 10). Despite the relative scope 
for mid-life crisis, Voltaire appears here to be at his most sceptical, dissecting and deconstructing 
several schools of thought: the matters of moral relativity, universal causation and freedom. 
Nonetheless, Voltaire also alleges that he is at his most ignorant at this point. 
 The line of enquiry in this work is not the ordered analyses intended with the Discours, but 
an outpouring of fifty six doutes, each of which stands as an independent unit of thought. Voltaire 
too approved of editing to some extent, for a few of the doutes are updated with information 
deemed crucial to his argument in newly composed units.  Taking, for example, doubt XIX, 
Dépendence entier de l’homme and doubt XXI, Encore un mot de la dépendence de l’homme, one 
can see that Voltaire begins by proposing that human creation may be partially explained in 
teleological terms whilst he simultaneously debunks technical metaphysical enquiry:  
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 Tout est moyen et fins dans mon corps; tout y est ressort, poulie, force mouvante, machine 
 hydraulique, équilibre de liqueurs, laboratoire de chimie. (Voltaire 2000, 20) 
 
Voltaire seems to suggest here that despite the logical deductions which are carried out in a 
chemistry laboratory, “laboratoire de chimie”, individual theorising about the makeup of mankind 
cannot be tested or proven in such conditions. This concurs with and expands upon Descartes’ 
contention in Les Passions de l’âme that the human soul is not noble born and that physicality can 
be attached to the expression each of the six primitive passions. 
  In terms of form and structure, in doubt XXI the author does not simply update that which 
he has already written concerning man’s guidance by a divine creator; rather, he asserts that his 
thoughts too are divine gifts, for human beings know not how to think. Furthermore, to illustrate 
human attempts at understanding divine creation Voltaire then gives the example of two differing 
theories: the fabrication of everything from a godly or universal form or that of godly omniscience 
and intervention in life.  The contrast is provided with Mallebranche on the one hand—“Qui osait 
prétendre que nous voyons tout dans Dieu même”—and the Stoics’ conviction that “c’est dieu qui 
agit en nous et que nous possédons un rayon de sa substance” on the other. The fact that there may 
be a middle way between these two schools of thought and hence a possible resolution of the 
universal quandary is enough to necessitate another doubt. By dint of the change in subject matter, 
Voltaire seems to have felt it necessary to make his new reflections distinct stylistically to evade 
crisis by his creation of part XXI. Indeed, even the conclusion is to self-reference and lapse into his 
proclaimed ignorance, “Je retombe (nomb.II) dans l’ignorance” (Voltaire 2000, 22). 
 For Voltaire, therefore, second-guessing and reconfiguration constitute key motions of his 
unbridled ponderings as an allegedly ignorant philosopher. Descartes is less accepting of such 
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structural and logical disarray opting for the alleged documentation of an autobiographical struggle 
culminating in his method as opposed to Voltaire’s satirical act of deconstruction. 
 On the other hand, rigidity and certitude are two elements which bind the 212 articles 
constituting Descartes' Les Passions de l'âme. The articles here are arranged in a tripartite structure. 
In part one, a theory of what the passions of the soul are and of their function in physiological terms 
is explained in general. In part two, Descartes commences the arduous task of listing and 'le 
dénombrement' of the passions and the demarcation of six primitive passions, « à savoir 
l'admiration, l'amour, la haine, le désir, la joie et la tristesse » (Descartes 1988, 196). It is in part 
three that all other non-primitive passions which derive from one of the six primitive passions are 
elucidated. How the composition of Les Passions differs from the other texts is that it begins in an 
epistolary manner with a series of four letters between the author and an unknown friend 
encouraging the publication of his new work. The friends are contemporaries Claude Clerselier and 
Father Claude Picot according to Descartes’ biographer Adrien Baillet (1649-1706). Nonetheless, 
contemporary critics seem to agree that the letters were fashioned by Descartes, if not written by 
him. Stephen H. Voss argues in his introduction to the work that 
  
 The style of the first and third letters, by the friend, is more stilted than Descartes' usual 
 style, but that proves very little: in my view they were at least written under Descartes' 
 direction and were probably written by the philosopher himself. (Voss 1989, 1) 
 
Peter France advances this argument to claim that such is Descartes’ anxiety “not only to be right, 
but to be seen to be right” (France 1972, 55) and, thus, that his letters are polemical self-advertising 
designed to arouse a favourable reception of his new works. But isn’t this all a bit cynical? Surely 
painting himself as an author so willing to appease le grand public and make his work a spectacle 
denies the very strong-willed and controlled schema that he markets. It may be more helpful here to 
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view the introduction to Les Passions de l'âme more as an experiment in genre. whereby the literary 
and philosophical Descartes sought to introduce one of his most physiological and definitive works 
in clear terms. In so doing, his readership may adhere to their roles as readers of physics and not 
concern themselves with the gossip mongering which features in personal correspondence: « Qu’il 
fear connaître que mon dessein n’a pas été d’expliquer les passions en orateur, ni même en 
philosophe moral, mais seulement en physicien » (Descartes 1988, 151). 
 In the varying approaches to publication and composition one can gain insight into the 
ulterior stylistic motives which pervaded each text, namely Descartes’ practicing of la méthode in 
his ordering of the content of subsequent publications. It has been noted by James M. Edie that 
Descartes sought “a philosophy not of the logical resolution of conflicting texts, but of discovery” 
(Edie 1969, 95), and thus sought to break from his past in abandoning former learning from the 
ancients and scholastics to embrace newer forms of philosophical introspection and expression. 
Moreover, Edie's analysis can be sensibly applied to sum up Descartes’ attitude towards his own 
texts: examples of unresolved works in progress, at a crossroads between crisis and circumspection 
but copiously documented. 
 
II Narratives, Rhetoric and Style 
 
While various ideas pre-exist the Discours, and editing may have brought the text to its neat 
assembly, it is possible for the reader to be duped by the narrative of progressive discovery and the 
tone of gradual enlightenment employed in this text. Descartes begins part I with the Lockean 
notion of tabula rasa, “d'y représenter ma vie comme en tableau” and in disposing of all 
preconceived ideas he proceeds to document an autobiographical, self-referential and seemingly 
modest process of Enlightenment. The reader is taken through a scathing account of Descartes’ 
childhood and adult education. By encouraging students, philosophers and his elders to reject their 
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academic influences on the micro and macro level, the author returns to his initial suggestion, "Le 
bon sens est la chose du monde la plus partagée” (Descartes 2005, 9). Voltaire agrees somewhat 
that common knowledge has been commonly distributed: "J'ai pensé que la nature a donné à chaque 
être la portion qui lui convient” (Descartes 2005, 7). However, it may be suggested that from school 
age, the thirst for learning lies in a desire to unveil the human composition and not solely to 
discover universal truths.  
 Yet this temporal and chronological course of discovery is far from logical and appears 
contradictory. It is only in synthesis that one can reformulate discovery, from an initial position of 
doubt, without the time element.  Having established this necessity for there to be doubt in Part I of 
the Discours, Part II introduces the méthode and Parts IV and V show and application of the 
méthode. Despite his surety, this process of methodological doubt must not be imitated, as it would 
risk evoking civic unrest and would perhaps be a maddening process to adhere to. Aprioristic 
conjecture will invite readers living unordered lives to admire the author's self-dismemberment and 
hereby, his attainment of the reasoned existence. While Le Philosophe ignorant makes apparent 
Voltaire’s capacity for the unbridled deconstruction of philosophy, Descartes opts for an indirect 
introduction to his Discours. In the employment of an abstract building metaphor for man’s 
reasoned existence, Descartes detracts from the more pressing matter of the deconstruction of his 
own methodology.   
 
 Ainsi ces anciennes cités qui, n’ayant été que commencement que des bourgades, sont 
 devenues par succession de temps de grandes villes[...]à voir comme ils sont arrangés, ici un 
 grand, là un petit, et comme ils rendent les rues courbées et inégales, on dirait que c’est 
 plutôt la fortune que la volonté de quelques hommes usant de raison que les ai disposés. 
 (Descartes 2005, 17-18) 
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While an orderly and neatly aligned town planning model may appeal aesthetically and suggest that 
reasoned living is a better alternative, does this mean that the quest for truth is a logical ordered one 
or rather that Descartes is offering a prelude to his own method that he must have had a vested 
interest in? Given that the philosopher emerged somewhat reconstructed from the embroilments of 
his own doubt, surely he could offer something a little clearer than intellectual parables in order to 
demystify what lead to his discovery of the method. Stylistically the quotation from part II above 
represents a unit of reasoned thought. Long, complex sentences become entangled as the author 
writes his way to the truth and as such, analogies and images are used in order to offer a 
visualisation of the path to truth:  
 
 qu'il est beaucoup meilleur de les suivre que d'entreprendre d'aller plus droit, en grimpant 
 au-dessus des rochers, et descendant jusques au bas de précipices. (Descartes 2005, 20) 
 
Such analogies are far more effective than the abstract images evoked to convey passions in Les 
Passions de l'âme, for example: 
 
 Mais la tristesse de cette pitié n'est pas amère; et comme celle que causent les actions 
 funestes qu'on voit représenter sur un théâtre, elle est plus dans l'extérieur et dans le sens, 
 que dans l'intérieur de l'âme. (Descartes 2005, 264)    
 
Descartes has thus chosen emotive and descriptive vocabulary very carefully indeed so that each of 
his arguments is met with the appropriate imagery fitting to the framework of genre within which 
his text functions. Considering that Les Passions de l’âme does little to present itself as an 
autobiographical account in the manner in which the Discours does, this might seem unsurprising. 
Recent contemplations about the nature of narrative discourse as it pertains to philosophical texts 
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suggests that the genre of Descartes’ work might be preordained by dint of the very title attached to 
it: 
 
 The major didactic prose works of classical antiquity, works of philosophy or rhetoric […] 
 likewise respect the rule of restraint […] It is the middle ages that inaugurate the use of 
 thematic titles […] The same type of title appears in Descartes. (Genette 1997, 362) 
 
Furthermore, if Gérard Genette’s description of the restraining titles of didactic texts holds true, 
Descartes’ Discours can be considered a didactical example of deconstruction of both philosophical 
heritage and literary genres. Nevertheless, the image of reconstruction and building upon solid 
foundations is a recurrent one in the Discours. Before introducing le Morale Provisoire in Part III, 
Descartes again asserts that the search for truth must begin with destruction—"Avant de commencer 
à rebâtir le logis où on demeure” (Descartes 2005, 27)—and proceeds to give a series of four 
maxims which the sceptical philosopher must follow to avoid censorship, to escape the 'forêt' of 
doubt and to control our desires.   
 The reader becomes bound by these maxims in their indisputably logical format of a 
hypothesis, then the elimination of objections, then restated hypothesis and delayed conclusions. 
Pierre-Alain Cahné analyses use of the verb “conduire” in “conduire par ordre les pensées” (rule 
three of the method) to illustrate this phenomenon. 
 
 Donc, d'un côté nous avons l'image du jugement précipité et subi, et de l'autre celle d'un 
 jugement concerté et voulu: d'où notre conclusion, où nous voudrions simplement suggérer 
 que « conduire par ordre » équivaut à qui interviendrait ici, dans son constant souci de 
 mettre en valeur l'attention qu'il ne faut jamais cesser de développer, pour garder le droit fil 
 du chemin de la pure méthode, toujours guetté par la tentation du labyrinthe, d'où: 
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 « conduire par ordre »: conduire de manière volontaire, où par ordre renforce le sens même 
 de conduire. (Cahné 1980, 160) 
 
Supposing that all of this is preconceived, that each tense choice, encapsulation, conjunction and 
adverb has been premeditated to bully the reader into submission, what then is the difference 
between Descartes' rhetoric and reality? How will the reader know if the truth is beyond the efforts 
made to convince us? Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, in a somewhat hasty analysis, positions Descartes 
in the centre of a self-inflicted dichotomy in which he "seems torn between the demands of truth 
and those of persuasion, between his inheritance of traditional genres and his new directions" (Rorty 
1983, 548). The crisis that exists between the quest for reason and the implications of literary 
rhetoric does appear a modern phenomenon and not one that would be considered a constituent part 
of the exponent of Cartesian dualism. 
 Cruder still, it could be said that such manners of reasoning have become so much of a game 
to Descartes that they are overriding his innate common sense or capacity for clear expression. This 
structure could equally be perceived as a deliberate attempt by the author to meddle with the 
boundaries of what makes non-fiction, not fiction. To say the jury is out on this matter is to make an 
ignorant assumption, but what is clear is that the Discours is contradictory in style. It establishes a 
system of thinking by destroying a pre-existent one and uses rhetoric while condemning it. The 
impact of Descartes’ syntax is unquestionable but there are loopholes in the overall argument which 
lead to a state of crisis of authorial intent, encouraging the very scepticism Descartes decries.   
 
III Satire and external influences 
 
I have waited until now to refer to Lettres Philosophiques in detail because enquiry into the critical 
work's genre has brought exceptionally mixed responses and has proved problematic in terms of 
14
Journal of Franco-Irish Studies, Vol. 2 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 9
https://arrow.tudublin.ie/jofis/vol2/iss1/9
DOI: 10.21427/D7BQ76
168 
 
categorisation. Beeson and Cronk are keen to probe the ambivalence of Voltaire’s standpoint when 
comparing the definitive examples in his Philosophical Dictionary with the Lettres Philosophiques: 
“Is he an original philosophical thinker? Or is he simply a vulgariser and publicist for the thought of 
others?” (Beeson & Cronk 2009, 27). The point is not that the categorisation of Lettres 
Philosophiques as philosophical is essential or even helpful, but the fact that its genre is still 
debated in critics' circles has certainly helped immortalise what R.Pomea has called 'ce manifeste 
des lumières' (Voltaire 1992, 60). Where Pomea understands Lettres Philosophiques as being 
representative of the age of Enlightenment and opts for historical categorisation, Beeson and Cronk 
contest the ‘thematic title’ of the text and the didactic philosophical discussion which Voltaire 
purports to offer. 
 Eighteenth century French Enlightenment saw the questioning of long accepted values, 
fostering enquiry on all fronts and with a greater sense of relativity replacing the spirit of 
absolutism. Voltaire's name is intimately linked to the age of the Enlightenment, yet much of Les 
Lettres Philisophiques appears to guise itself as fictional. 
 In 1726, a dispute with Le chevalier de Rohan lead to Voltaire's departure for England 
where, from a safe distance, he would shine the spotlight of reason upon a variety of topics: 
religious denominations (letters 1-7); government (letters 8 and 9); social issues (letters 10 and 11); 
great thinkers (letters 12,13,14); Newtonian theories (letters 15,16,17); cultural issues (letters 18-
24) and finally metaphysical questions. It is clear from the narrator’s sarcasm and the criticisms 
made of the French system by English comparison that this text was to be far more than a simple 
travelogue. Thanks to his subtle undercutting of the ancien régime, the literary mode3 of satire may 
be the category best fitting for classifying Lettres Philosophiques. Although there is no real doctrine 
as to the derivation of the term satire, two polarised historic suggestions have prevailed. To justify 
                                                          
3  I mean as opposed to the somewhat static nature of the travelogue, a genre non-fictional travel writing is often 
cornered into. 
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my choice of considering the Lettres Philosophiques as satire a brief note on satirical categories 
seems fitting. 
 The first historic definition is satyr, a mythical beast, half man half goat, wild, lawless, rule-
breaking creatures and bringers of disorder. These qualities are hence transferred to denote the work 
of a satirist as being transgressive, obscene and potentially dangerous. Secondly we have lanx 
satura, which was in fact a dish of mixed ingredients served after a Roman meal. This idea of 
miscellaneous content is transferred to satire as is a sense of intrigue—the dish or literature is food 
for thought. Over the centuries, writers and critics have opted for one definition or the other and 
they have subsequently preferred one type of analysis. This analysis was usually rooted with either 
Horace or Juvenal. The form of lanx satura in satire has been viewed as civilised, obeying and 
polished—much like the Roman Banquet—whilst the satyr remains hard-hitting, direct, passionate 
and launching attacks on society. 
 The gap which lies between judging the Lettres Philosophiques as either satyr or lanx satura 
very much depends upon whether the narrator is considered to be Voltaire himself or a ridiculous 
archetype of a Frenchman. In the first letter, for example, we see an overly courteous Frenchman 
bowing, scraping and insisting on using the “vous” form in what is his first encounter with a 
Quaker. If Voltaire was not enough of a parody by his physical actions in this instance, he is then 
advised quite plainly by the Quaker that “Les gens de ton pays [. . .] font trop de compliments de 
reverences” (Voltaire 1992, 1). This subtle parody of the ridiculous Frenchman disappears in letter 
five, with its vehement attack upon the hypocrisy of religion on both sides of La Manche. His 
highly  subversive claims about Catholicism being beyond the pale in England and the activities of 
Protestants in France “des jeunes connus par leurs débauches et élevés à la prélature par des 
intrigues de femmes” (Voltaire 1992, 17) verges on harangue. The author's final statement in this 
letter, which can be read as an humorous aside, serves its purpose and diffuses the vehemence 
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formerly evoked: “Mais ce sont des vilains hérétiques à brûler à tous les diables, comme dit maître 
François Rabelais; c'est pourquoi je ne me mêle pas de leurs affaires” (Voltaire 1992, 17). 
It is this crafty turn of phrase which leaves an impression that the author's tongue is firmly in cheek, 
diffusing the former sensation he whipped up only a few statements previously. In his awareness of 
the extent to which he can be critical of his own regime, one might argue that he shows a broader 
distinction between history and polemic, between that which is oratory and risqué and that which is 
witty rhetoric. 
 Two important further factors lead me to maintain that Lettres Philosophiques is much more 
of a satirical sneer than a jovial poke in the ribs. Firstly, the author uses this satire in utmost 
seriousness to scorn his contemporaries. Descartes is on the receiving end of this heavy criticism in 
letter fourteen:  
 
Je ne nierai pas que tous les autres ouvrages de M.Descartes fourmillent d'erreurs [. . .] 
Alors sa philosophie eut plus qu'un roman ingénieux et tout au plus vraisemblable pour les 
ignorants. (Voltaire 1992, 49) 
 
Secondly, and perhaps less likely, is the reason that he embraced the literary movement of the 
English Restoration period, associating with comedic dramatists and satirists such as Jonathan 
Swift, William Wycherley and the irrepressible Earl of Rochester. When the Lettres Philosophiques 
are regarded in this context, Voltaire, like Swift, refutes satire's supposed moral basis. Although the 
satiric mode can attack individuals, encourage shunning of vice on a public level and therefore 
profess to be morally enriching, the extent to which satire could fully reform an individual or 
problem is debateable. The mechanisms which Voltaire has at work here are therefore more 
complicated than those as prescribed in the lanx satura/ satyr model. However, the means of attack, 
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through personal slighting and witticisms, show a certain familiarity with this literary mode at his 
time of writing.  
    *   *   * 
Having come to an appreciation of Voltaire's Le Philosophe ignorant and Lettres Philosophiques 
and Descartes’ Discours de la méthode and Les Passions de l'âme  through sustained analysis of the 
presentation, form and argumentation methods employed by each author, several concluding points 
can be deduced. Primarily, the physical presentation of a text presents much more of an insight into 
a philosophical author's methodology than is often supposed. Through Descartes' stylistic technique, 
the method he wishes to promote becomes something intangible and unconsciously practiced. 
Critics have described their uncontrollable emulation of Descartes' style in writing, which on the 
one hand makes for rather confused research, but on the other pleasantly preserves the crisis of the 
Discours itself.  
 That the French philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries attested to 
deconstruction in the formulation of narratives, rhetoric and style, ensured a hard-sell of 
philosophical constructs which would otherwise lack context. This is not to say that Voltaire, the 
arch-satirist, displayed any indebtedness to his predecessors in Lettres Philosophiques, nor did he 
hold sacred the metaphysical constructs Descartes professed in his later work Le Philosophe 
ignorant. Apparent crises between the autobiographical, academic, confessional and didactic forms 
in Descartes are more representative of an unreadiness to distinguish the quest for truth from the 
rhetoric employed than they are ordered accounts of his mind-method. To term Descartes’ Discours 
‘noncommital’ would be a vulgarisation of the complex forms employed, and yet casting Voltaire’s 
Lettres Philosophiques as anything less than a satirical sneer would overturn the delicate axes of 
rhetoric upon which both texts rest.  
 Writing amidst crisis therefore does not necessarily preclude escape. In fact, Descartes and 
Voltaire are shown to be similarly perplexed by the very constructs they create to divest French 
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thought of unrest. This effect is rendered cyclical when the best known of contemporary French 
philosophers Alain Badiou, in a paper entitled ‘le désir de philosophie’ (1999), vouched for a 
Voltairian iconoclastic approach to renewing philosophy by employing Cartesian foundation-
setting: 
 
 My position is to break with these frameworks of thought, to find another philosophical 
 style, a style other than that of interpretation, of logical grammarian analysis, or of 
 polyvalence and language games-that is, to rediscover a foundational style, a decided style, a 
 style in the school of a Descartes for example. (Badiou 2005, 37) 
 
Thus, in terms of idea making, the contradictions between the presentation, argumentation and form 
of ideas communicated in Descartes and Voltaire invite analysis as to how French philosophy can 
survive or be spurned by crises of thought. For Descartes, resolution was sought in creating the 
Discours from a point of introspection and publishing safely in the Netherlands. For Voltaire, 
evolution of French Enlightenment thought was a matter initially inspired outre-Manche in that 
perfidious “best of all possible worlds.” 
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